What Putin really wants

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan are a Russian investigative journalists and co-founders of Agentura.ru. Both are senior fellows at the Center for European Policy Analysis.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s first steps toward getting his deal in Ukraine were met with a storm of emotions in Moscow.

Never before has Russian media cited its Western counterparts so extensively. After all, for the last three years, Russian society was told to turn away from the treacherous, decadent West and look toward the East — namely, China and North Korea. And yet, even the country’s most influential daily Kommersant — typically known for its reasonable and rational tone — ran the headline “Putin’s triumph” in its review of international coverage surrounding Trump’s phone call with the Russian president.

But there is a reason for this sudden shift.

The messaging from Washington now aligns with the Kremlin’s worldview: Trump, the powerful American godfather, will sit across from the crime baron Vladimir Putin — less mighty than before but still getting stronger — and they will decide what to do with Ukraine.  

The Kremlin sees Trump’s move as a correct response to Moscow’s demand to respect Putin as an equal partner, as well as public recognition that Ukraine and Europe are to have a subordinate role in negotiations. It believes that Europe — liberal and hypocritically fixated on rule of law — must adjust to its true place in this brave new world: that of a supporting actor in the drama of strongmen.

There’s no room for international law in this primitive 19th-century-like narrative. And Ukraine’s role is reduced to that of a client or failed state on the U.S. payroll, faced with the reality of repaying the military and economic support it received during the war and granting the U.S. rights to extract its natural resources, including rare earth metals — all fully understandable from Moscow’s perspective.

The practical outcome the Kremlin expects from all of this is to gain some Ukrainian territories —the four regions its annexed, as well as the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that haven’t yet been occupied. That, along with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s removal, is what the Kremlin would sell to its people as a victory.

The demands are tactical and symbolic — Zelenskyy’s head, recognition of Russia’s advances into Ukrainian territory and a full stop to any discussion of NATO membership for Ukraine.

However, this scenario is still a far cry from complete Russian control over Ukraine, or a significant shift in Russia’s position in Europe. It feels like a more temporary solution than Moscow would like — or, as most influential Kremlin foreign policy practitioners admit, it’s no Yalta.

But the truth is, this deal isn’t really meant to lead to sustainable peace — that was never the goal. Trump may believe in his second American revolution, but his interlocutors in Moscow don’t. They’re far more convinced of the deep state’s indestructibility than any conspiracy theorist in the U.S. And they believe this deep state has always been, and always will be, hostile to Russia.

In the absence of any real ideology, the Kremlin has made ressentiment its creed — a mix of pride in the former Russian empire, whether under czars or Soviet commissars, and a strong sense of grievance and injustice toward the treacherous West. And as with any ideology, it comes with a clear narrative about what went wrong and who’s to blame.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s first steps toward getting his deal in Ukraine were met with a storm of emotions in Moscow. | Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images

An integral of part of this mentality is a strong sense of history, understood as a collection of centuries worth of grievances, leading to the widely held belief that Russia is doomed to perpetually fight the West, in one form or another, until one side achieves total victory. And the Kremlin is certain the West has always been after Russia’s complete destruction, starting with the crusaders sent by the Pope to invade Orthodox Russia in the 13th century.

In short, real peace with the West is unachievable; only periodic interludes are possible. And Russia, always a besieged fortress, cannot have true allies. The famous line attributed to Czar Alexander III in the late 19th century — that “Russia has just two allies, the armed forces and the navy” — has been cited proudly and incessantly, and it resonates deeply with Putin.

As a consequence of this narrative, Russia doesn’t really feel like a world pariah either — not only because of the support it receives from China, but because its elites don’t believe in the concept of true allies or the long-standing treaties such relationships allow.

It’s a very dark view of the world. One that assumes Putin would try to use Trump to gain an advantage — opting for a tactical move, as strategic peace is impossible.

But while the Russian leader may see himself as more experienced and skilled in this kind of tactical game, in reality, he’s much more susceptible to sudden emotional outbursts. Russia has always defined itself through its relationship with the West — and since the Cold War, its relationship with the U.S. in particular.

And what Russia always demands is respect.

Lest we forget, Putin began his presidency in 2000 by seeking just that from then-U.S. President George W. Bush. Deep inside, he is always looking for recognition from Washington.